[ocaml-platform] Secure OPAM?

Hannes Mehnert hannes at mehnert.org
Mon Feb 16 11:19:26 GMT 2015


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On 01/18/2015 21:11, Anil Madhavapeddy wrote:
> This is certainly something that needs to go on the roadmap sooner 
> rather than later, and issue #423 is still the place to record your
> opinions.
> 
> Having a signify-like model to let an OPAM mirroring script sign 
> distfiles would be a good first step, since the complexities of 
> managing a per-contributor signing infrastructure would be quite 
> significantly more work.

Just as a short news-item - haskell debian build host got compromised
yesterday - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9054795
I do think we need to keep the build hosts/repository hosts outside of
the trust chain, and push signing all the way up to the authors (or
rather maintainers).

> Note that the OPAM remote is HTTPS by default since OPAM 1.1.

That sounds great - where are the trust anchors taken from? Systemwide
(if so, from where/how/why)?

Once the dust clears up here, I plan to work on implementing tuf
(instead of signify/PGP, it seems like I'm biased towards TLS/X.509
these days to be able to use in-house tools).


Hannes
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